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the same work under similar conditions of employment as the em-
ployees. However, the Court stated, "The Company's decision to
contract out the maintenance work did not alter the Company's basic
operation .... No capital investment was contemplated .... 31 The
Court strongly indicated that its decision should not be extended,
"We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to
hold ... that the type of 'contracting out' involved in this case ...
is a statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d). Our deci-
sion need not and does not encompass other forms of 'contracting
out'....,32 The concurring opinion in Fibreboard stated:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as impos-
ing a duty to bargain collectively regarding... managerial
decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. De-
cisions concerning the commitment of... capital and the basic
scope of the enterprise are not. . . primarily about conditions
of employment... [within the meaning of section 8(d)].33
The test adopted by the court in Transmarine is the most equitable
solution to the problem. It protects the interests of both management
and labor. Management is protected since an employer's freedom to
make basic managerial decisions is retained. Labor is protected
against summary dismissal since management must bargain concerning
the effect of the decision upon the employees.
W. GILBERT FAULK, JR.
COMPENSABILITY IN EMINENT DOMAIN OF
LESSEE'S OPTION TO PURCHASE
A leasehold estate is a property right and an interest in land which
is compensable when taken by eminent domain,1 but there is con-
siderable controversy as to whether a lessee's unexercised option to
3id. at 213 (emphasis added).
2Id. at 215.
Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
"United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); A.W. Duckett
& Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875);
Illinois Power Co. v. Miller, 11 111. App. 2d 296, 137 N.E.2d 78 (1956); Korf v. Flem-
ing, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d 85 (1948);Eisenring v. Kansas Turnpike Authority,
183 Kan. 774, 332 P.2d 539 (1958); Lookholder v. Ziegler, 354 Mich. 28, 91 N.V.2d
834 (1958).
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purchase is compensable when there is no provision in the lease for
the contingency of a taking by eminent domain.
2
In Sholom, Incorporated v. State Roads Commission,3 Sholom was
a tenant under a lease which contained an option to purchase the
land and options to renew the lease. Prior to the expiration of the
first term of the lease, portions of the land were taken under eminent
domain proceedings. Sholom notified the lessor that it intended to
exercise its option to purchase, but upon realizing that the con-
demnation would deny direct access to its place of business, it did
not exercise its option. In admitting evidence of the value of Sholom's
leasehold estate,4 the court excluded evidence of the value of the
unexercised option to purchase and of the value of the unexercised
options to renew.5 On appeal Sholom sought compensation for its
unexercised option to purchase the land and for its unexercised
options to renew. The court held that Sholom was entitled to com-
pensation for either its unexercised option to purchase or its un-
exercised options to renew.
The decision in Sholom is predicated upon a distinction infre-
quently made, that distinction being that in considering unexercised
options to purchase there are two categories of option-holder's: option-
holder's who have no interest in the land; and option-holder's who
have an interest in the land, such as a leasehold estate. It was
reasoned that because the option to purchase was contained in the
lease it was part of the leasehold estate granted and, as such, compens-
able as a portion of the damage done to the leasehold estate. There-
fore, the court held that evidence of the value of an unexercised
2E.g., Nicholson v. Weaver, 194 F.2d 804 (9 th Cir. 1952) (compensation allowed);
City of Ashland v. Kittle, 347 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. g6i) (compensation denied); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, io6 N.W.2d 727 (196o) (compensa-
tion denied).
229 A.2d 576 (Md. 1967).
'Both the lessor and the lessee are parties in the condemnation litigation and
may introduce evidence as to the value of their separate interests. Eagle Lake
Improvement Co. v. United States, 16o F.2d 182 (5 th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947); United States v. 1.87 Acres of Land, 155 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.
1946). A lessee is not accorded an initial right to have his leasehold estate evaluated
separately, but justice dictates that the owner of each individual interest should
receive just compensation for his loss. Where evidence of the value of a leasehold
estate is excluded from the proceedings, further litigation to determine the value
of the leasehold estate is justified. New Jersey Highway Authority v. J.&F. Holding
Co., 4o N.J. Super. 3o9, 123 A.2d 25 (1956).
5The court refused to permit Sholom's appraiser to give his opinion of the
before- and after-taking values of the option to purchase and the renewal options.
229 A.2d at 579.
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option to purchase was admissible as evidence relating to the dam-
age done to the leasehold estate.
I. The Unexercised Option to Purchase Not Contained in a Lease
The general theory of compensation in eminent domain requires
that a person have an actual estate or interest in the land to recover
compensation; a mere contractual relation not creating an interest is
not sufficient.6 Options do not fit into this theory because an option is
a mere contract whereby the owner of property agrees with another
person that the latter shall have the right to purchase the property at
a fixed price within a specified period of time.7 The option contract
differs from the typical bilateral contract in that it imposes no bind-
ing obligation upon the person holding the option; the option-giver
is bound to convey, but the option-holder is not bound to buy.
8
This differentiation was employed in East Bay Municipal Utility
District v. Kieffer9 to hold that the option-holder was not entitled
to compensation. In that case the condemnor sought to supply water
to various municipalities, and the option-holder held unexercised
options to purchase the land involved. The court conceded that such
an option is property but reasoned that the option does not create
an interest in the land itself because it obtains only an election for
the option-holder, nothing mutually binding. Such an option, not
being a mutually binding contract and not having been exercised
prior to the institution of condemnation proceedings, conveys no
interest in the property, and consequently is a non-compensable
interest.'0 However, in State v. New Jersey Zinc Company, 1 where
02 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.23, at 73-74 (3d ed. rev. 1963).
'Graney v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 383, 386 (S.D. W. Va. 1966); Hopkins
v. Barlin, 3i Wash. 2d 26o, 196 P.2d 347 (1948).
'Suburban Improvement Co. v. Scott Lumber Co., 59 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1932);
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948).
199 Cal. App. 240, 278 P. 476 (1929).
ICravero v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 91 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956); see
People v. Ocean Shore RoR., 90 Cal. App. 2d 464, 203 P.2d 579 (1949); Carroll v.
City of Louisville, 354 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1962); State v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 40
N.J. 560, 193 A.2d 244 (1963); Taggarts Paper Co. v. State, 187 App. Div. 843, 176
N.Y. Supp. 97 (1919). English and Canadian decisions hold that an option is an
interest in land and compensable. See Oppenheimer v. Minister of Transport, I
K.B. 242, 3 All E.R. 485 (1941); London & Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch.
D. 562 (1882); The King ex rel. Atty-Gen. of Canada v. North York Township, 2
D.L.R. 381 (Exch. 1947).
"I4o N.J. 560, 193 A.2d 244 (1963). The option-holder by exercising his option
either before or after the condemnation proceedings are begun, but before the
entry of the award, becomes the equitable owner of the land. His interest is
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the option-holder exercised his option after the institution of the
condemnation action but prior to the entry of the award, it was held
that condemnation proceedings do not void an option and that the
option-holder has the right to exercise his option until the award is
made and the taking is consummated.
In the novel case of In re Petition of Governor Miffin Joint School
Authority 2 it was determined that an unexercised option to purchase
land was a right which should be compensable in eminent domain.
The court concluded that the option-holder had been precluded by
condemnation from exercising his right to elect to purchase and
held that the option was a valuable personal right, which should
be compensable.' 3 "Surely, this [right] must have possessed some
value-it took a $9,ooo down payment to secure itl" 14 The option-
holder was accordingly due compensation for his right but not due
compensation for his interest in the property; he had no property
interest, only the possibility of acquiring one.
II. The Unexercised Option to Purchase Contained in a Lease
In condemnation proceedings both the lessor and the lessee are
entitled to share in the award according to their respective interests.
The lessor is due compensation for the damage done to his reversion-
ary interest, and the lessee is due compensation for the damage done
to his leasehold estate.15
The option to purchase land, contained in a lease, is distinguished
from a mere option to purchase in that in addition to being a con-
tract, it is a covenant in the lease.' 6 Such an option covenant in a
lease is a convenant running with the land as it affects the land and
compensable as a mutually binding contract of sale arises; the option when ex-
ercised becomes a contract for the sale of realty. See also Hennessey v. Wilson, 225
Miss. 366, 83 So. 2d 176 (1955). In Hennessey the option expired before initiation
of eminent domain proceedings for the acquisition of a right of way. The option-
holder had no interest in the property at the time the award was made and therefore
was not entitled to any part of the award.
34o1 Pa. 387, 164 A.2d 221 (196o) (this case was relied upon heavily in Sholom).
a1The Mifflin decision is supported somewhat by East Bay in that East Bay
states that an option is property, and thus tacity implies that an option has some
value independnet of any relationship to the land.
14164 A.2d at 225.
154 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1242, at 293-96 (3d ed. rev. 1962).
'The option covenant in a lease is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell,
but it is a binding, executed contract by which the lessor of the property agrees
with the lessee that the lessee shall have the right to buy the property involved at
a fixed price within a specified period of time. Keogh v. Peck, Yi6 Ill. 318, 147
N.E. 266, 269 (1925).
iL968]
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the estate granted.17 Covenants which run with the land are assign-
able' s and constitute more than an in personam right,19 since they
attach to the land and are transferred as part of the ownership of
the land to all subsequent takers. It has been stated that an option
covenant, as any other covenant in a lease, is an interest which
inhers in the land from the date of the execution of the lease.
20
Recognizing this distinction, Sholom held that because the option-
holder was also a lessee it had an "ancillary" interest in the land, the
leasehold estate. Since the option to purchase was an essential portion
of that estate, evidence of the value of the unexercised option to pur-
chase should be considered in determining the damage done to the
leasehold estate, for which the lessee was due compensation.
Persuasive support for the Sholom theory can be found in Cullen
& Vaughn Company v. Bender Company,21 where the lessee had an
option to purchase. The lessee's water rights and privileges were taken
by eminent domain and the lessor was compensated; no damages were
awarded to the lessee. Shortly thereafter, the lessee exercised his
option to purchase. The lessor demanded the full purchase price for
the land, and the lessee contended that the amount due the lessor
was the purchase price less the damages awarded to the lessor. The
lessee contended that because of the taking of the water rights, he
had to install other motive power and the taking had damaged
his option to purchase the land. The court stated, "It is not necessary
to decide whether an option, not coupled with a lease, conveys an
interest [in land] prior to the time the option is exercised. In this
case a lease was executed, and one of its conditions was that the
lessee might purchase the property for a fixed sum at any time during
the term of the lease."'22
In Cullen & Vaughn it was impossible to award damages for the
leasehold estate as the option to purchase had been exercised; there-
fore, the court found that equitable conversion applied. It no longer
being possible to convey the entire property as a result of the con-
"'E.g., Ebensberger v. Sinclair Refining Co., 165 F.2d 803 (5 th Cir. 1948).
'sAugtauga Cooperative Leasing Ass'n v. Ward, 250 Ala. 229, 33 So. 2d 904
(1948); Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662, 7o Am. Dec. 678 (1858); Rosello v. Hayden,
79 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1955); Keogh v. Peck, 316 Iil. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925); J.F.
Auderer Laboratories, Inc. v. Deas, 223 La. 923, 67 So. 2d 179 (1953).
'aArkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Evans, 338 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Ark. 196o).
223 Tracts of Land v. United States, 177 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1949).
"122 Ohio St. 82, 17o N.E. 633 (193o).
1 id. at 636-37.
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demnation, the fund awarded represented the part of the land
condemned and was subject to the option.
23
Sholom is the only case which allows compensation on the theory
that an unexercised option to purchase, contained in a lease, is an
interest in the property and compensable as part of the damage to
the leasehold estate. The other decisions involving the unexercised
option to purchase either deny compensation on a contract theory,
as in the case of a mere option to purchase, 24 or allow compensation
on a theory of equitable conversion.25
The early case of Cornell-Andrews Smelting Company v. Boston
& Providence Railroad Corporation2o involved an unexercised option
to purchase held by a lessee. The court held that the unexercised option
created no estate in the land, and consequently the lessee's rights
were contractual only. However, the court further held that the
lessee was not remediless and allowed recovery on the theory of
equitable conversion. The lessee, option-holder, by exercising the
option after the fund had been awarded, could buy the award at
the option price. This method of compensating the option-holder has
been attacked27 on the ground that, in many instances, it would place
him in a very advantageous situation. By not exercising his option
until after the fund is awarded, the option-holder becomes an op-
portunist. If the fund is greater than the option price, the option-
holder then could exercise his option-purchase the fund on a theory
of equitable conversion-and realize an unjust profit.
The Sholom theory does not have the shortcoming that the equit-
able conversion theory has. In admitting evidence of the value of
the unexercised option to purchase as part of the evidence of the
damage done by the taking to the leasehold estate, no unjust profit
is realized by any party. The lessee is merely compensated in full for
the taking of his leasehold estate. The cases denying compensation on
a contract theory treat an option contained in a lease as the equivalent
of a bare option. This theory maintains that an unexercised option
2"It no longer being possible to convey the entire property, the fund which
represents the part conveyed belongs to the lessee, as purchaser." Id. at 637.
24City of Ashland v. Kittle, 347 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1961); Comell-Andrews Smelting
Co. v. Boston & P.R.R., 2o9 Mass. 298, 95 N.E. 887 (1911); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, io6 N.W.2d 727 (196o); In re Water Front, 246
N.Y. I, 157 N.E. 911 (1927) (a condemnation clause in the lease prevented compensa-
tion in any event).
25Nicholson v. Weaver, 194 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1952); 23 Tracts of Land v.
United States, 177 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1949).
1-o9 Mass. 298, 95 N.E. 887 (1911).
2In re Water Front, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911 (1927); City of Ashland v. Kittle,
347 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1961).
